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TRANSLATION OF A [REDACTED] DOCUMENT DATED 1. 10. 51.
ENTITLED "CENTRAL POLITICAL BUREAU ON WORKING DIRECTIONS
FOR THE EXECUTION OF THE PARTY'S URGENT TASKS".

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In the Party's October Resolution (i.e. "to struggle for greater victories in war") the urgent tasks of the Party have already been mentioned. The principles underlying the execution thereof have also been clearly indicated. According to these principles, a great many of the concrete methods are greatly different to those of the past: some of them even completely different. Therefore, in order that the directing organs of various grades may have guidance in the matter of concrete execution, and so that uniformity throughout Malaya may be gained, all problems that must be brought up in regard to the concrete execution of various tasks are briefly brought up and explained.

This guidance is only a supplementary explanation of the Resolution regarding the Party's urgent tasks; and, moreover, it only points out the main problems of the concrete execution of each and every task. Apart from executing their tasks in accordance with the Party's Resolution and this guidance, the various places must also go further in reviewing past activities in order to absorb valuable lessons and experience, and, according to the fundamentals of the Resolution and the guidance, to create more and richer concrete methods by which to enable us to carry out our activities more satisfactorily and with greater results.

Let us now bring up the tasks one by one as under:-

TASK ONE.

"To expand and consolidate the mass organisations."

A R S O N .

With regard to executing the first task - that of "expanding and consolidating the mass organisations". In order to

establish closer relations with the masses and strive to gain a wider sympathy of the masses, the following must be carried out. In regard to the work of creating disturbances and sabotaging, where there is no direct military significance, it is necessary to revise and clarify the following few problems:-

(a) All acts of confiscating identity cards, labour passes and ration rice cards must be stopped. They must not be confiscated under any circumstances. This is because in the present position, in which we are incapable of smashing the reactionary identity card system of the British Imperialists, the confiscation of identity cards cannot, generally speaking, be welcomed by the masses.

(b) Not to burn concentration camps and labourers' quarters (including those built by the enemy). Although the burning of labourers' quarters and concentration camps does deliver a blow to the enemy to a certain degree, yet it causes at the same time a lot of inconvenience to the masses, with unfavourable political reaction. Therefore, we do not want to burn them. Further, we also do not want to burn the concentration camps built by the enemy and in which there are still no masses living. The reason is, after we have burned them the enemy will not on that account suspend his plan of driving the masses into such concentration camps. He will either compel the masses to build them again or he will himself put up some much shabbier houses for the masses, or else he will drive the masses pell-mell to street corners. On comparison, therefore, it is better not to engage in arson.

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As regards the houses requisitioned by the enemy either for permanent or temporary accommodation (this refers to houses of the masses, including those of the capitalists) we will not burn them when we launch our attack on this base. If, however, in the course of launching our attack, we find that only fire power will decide the struggle (this refers to cases where there are no masses living in them) then we may proceed with the work of burning.

All those buildings of the enemy which do not accommodate the masses and all those buildings belonging to the reactionary capitalists, with the exception, of course, of those structures of Public Utilities or of the Department of Communications, may be burned. If, however, there are unarmed watchmen employed to guard them and it is likely to endanger their lives or those of their families in the course of burning such buildings, then we will not do so.

If, in burning the aforementioned buildings, it is liable to endanger the adjacent houses of the masses, or the stores of non-reactionary capitalists, then we will not do so in order to avoid losses to the masses. However, it is reckoned that there is no likelihood of other houses being endangered, and even if this should accidentally occur, that will be another matter altogether.

(c) We will not burn the Post Office, the Railway Stations or the passenger coaches. The reason is because, firstly, they do not have any

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military significance and, secondly, they belong to Public Utilities or Public Communication Services. The result of burning them will not be favourable to us politically.

(d) The various kinds of vehicles as under should not be burnt because, firstly, they have no direct military significance and, secondly, they belong to Public Utilities or Public Communication Services. The result of burning them will not be politically favourable to us:-

(i) Public 'buses and taxis, etc., including those belonging to the British Imperialists.

(ii) Mail vans (including those belonging to the British Imperialists and those belonging to private owners who undertake to convey mails for the British Imperialists). We may attack for the sake of seizing arms on such vehicles but will not burn. We will only confiscate mail belonging to the Government of the British Imperialists, the Military and Police, enemy spies and running dogs, rubber estates of the enemy, reactionary elements and "running dog" public organisations. We will not seize the mail of private individuals, nor the mail of those of whom we are doubtful.

(iii) Vehicles of the Health Department,

including the conservancy vans, the night-soil vans and hospital ambulances. AND the Red Cross vans.

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(iv) Fire brigade vehicles of the British Imperialists.

(e) We will not burn buildings and vehicles of a religious nature.

(f) With regard to lorries, latex vans and motor cars, etc., if they belong to the enemy (including those of the enemy's plantations, mines and the managers thereof) or are given by the enemy to his government or staff for their use, or if they belong to the reactionary elements, they will all be burnt, except, however, the private motor cars of Asian officials of the British Imperialists, provided such officials do not belong to the Military, Police or the Special Service of the British Imperialists. Our burning of all such vehicles will definitely deal a blow to the British Imperialists. Generally speaking, the British Imperialists will make good and replenish those vehicles that have been burnt and, therefore, will not cause the entire batch of drivers of such vehicles to be thrown out of employment. Therefore, we will continue to burn them everywhere.

In burning the aforementioned vehicles, unless there are armed escorts we will not threaten by opening fire. In the case of any driver who refuses to obey our orders to halt, we have to employ other methods of making him do so. If we open fire, we will completely frighten the driver and the other masses on the vehicle, and sometimes may even injure them by mistake and so cause them to misunderstand that we act in disregard of their lives and even to think that we are out to deal with them.

6.

In burning the goods vans of the reactionary elements, we must choose the opportunity when such vans are conveying the goods of such reactionary elements, or when they are proceeding without any goods before burning them. If such vans convey at the same time the goods of other non-reactionary merchants, we will not burn them in order to avoid causing losses to others and so bring about a political reaction adverse to us.

S A B O T A G E .

We will not sabotage water-pipes, reservoirs, electric power stations (which provide current for use in production centres and electric lamps in town) telephone wires, etc., because they constitute a portion of the public utilities and, besides, do not have any direct military significance. The result of sabotaging them will be politically unfavourable to us. Therefore, we will not proceed with their sabotage.

With regard to the slashing of rubber trees and the sabotaging of tin mines (including tin dredges) industrial factories, work-yards, etc., judging from the concrete conditions or factors at the present stage of the war, it is not wise to slash rubber trees because the slashing of rubber trees has no direct military significance, while it will, on the other hand, widely and seriously affect the livelihood of the masses. Thus the masses will certainly not gladly welcome and sincerely sympathise with such action of ours. At the same time, it will also, to a certain degree, affect the cognition of the masses in regard to the policy of the Party and in regard to the bearing the revolutionary war has upon their vital interests; consequently, it will inevitably impede the Party's attempt to

gain a closer unity with the broad masses of workers. This is to say that the result of the slashing of rubber trees will be very unfavourable to us politically. In fact, so far as dealing a blow to the enemy by slashing his rubber trees is concerned, although it is not a blow of decisive significance, yet if it can be widely carried out, the economic blow dealt him is not inconsiderable, and to a certain degree serves the purpose of obstructing the way of the enemy. But, compared to the unfavourable political reaction mentioned before, it will be more favourable not to do so in the interests of the conduct of the revolutionary war. As for the tin mines (including tin dredges) industrial factories, works-yards, etc., the matter should also be viewed similarly to that relating to rubber estates. Therefore, we will not engage in their sabotage.

If the war is situated in another sort of environment or conditions, as, for instance, when we are compelled to evacuate the masses, the workers, the factories and also to store away or destroy the various materials that may be useful to the enemy, then the slashing of rubber trees and the sabotaging of tin mines, factories, etc., must naturally be proceeded with, in which case it will also be easy for the masses to appreciate that it is a proper way of doing things.

In the course of the workers' struggle for improved livelihood, with a view to sounding a warning to the employers and giving impetus to the struggle, and also with the consent or request of the workers, we may proceed with the work of partial sabotage by slashing some rubber trees in rubber estates and tin mines, but we must not proceed with sabotage of an all-out character.

At the time when it becomes necessary for us to campaign for funds from the bourgeoisie, we may engage in a partial

mines as a tactic to sound warning to them. Before proceeding with it, however, it is necessary first to consider whether or not there is a possibility of our suitably taking care of the livelihood of the masses of workers who may be thus affected, so as to enable them to obtain jobs. As to whether we should assist the majority or the whole of them to obtain jobs, or for them to do so themselves, arrangements will be made according to the practical possibility. On the other hand, it is also necessary to take care of the areas covered by the "Min Yuen" and the necessity of supplies so that a "Min Yuen" working base and a supply centre may not be lost just on account of the work of sabotage carried out. This is to say that it is first necessary to make a practical comparison between the necessity of campaigning for funds and the interests of the local "Min Yuen" involved before deciding on whether or not to proceed with the act of sabotage. At the time of our proceeding with the work of sabotage, we must try to make full explanations to the masses of workers and to patiently talk them round, so that the workers may understand that, in order to continue with the revolutionary war, we must continually plan to obtain large sums to meet our military expenditure, that the bourgeoisie also must undertake the duty of contributing money, otherwise the war will be greatly affected. Therefore, we must compel those capitalists who are unwilling to discharge such a duty and make them contribute. When there is no better method to employ, and the circumstances are beyond our control, then the only best thing to do is to engage in partial sabotage by slashing some rubber trees in rubber estates and tin mines in order to force the capitalists to contribute money. In such circumstances, the masses who are thus affected must, for the

sake of the greater interests of the revolution, endure a certain amount of difficulty and loss. We will, of course, do our best to see to it that such difficulty and loss incurred by the workers shall be reduced to the minimum.

In launching our propaganda we shall point this out to the masses; that apart from being necessitated by a struggle for the improvement of the workers' livelihood and in the course of our campaigning for financial contributions from the capitalists, we will not engage in the work of sabotaging tin mines and factories and in the slashing of rubber trees.

M I L I T A R Y .

In carrying out actions that have direct military significance, attention must be paid to the following:-

(a) Before attacking the military and police which escort latex vans, or which oversee the movements of workers at work or going out on the streets, or if members of the military and police board the same 'bus as other masses, we must consider whether we have the confidence in reducing to the minimum the possible casualties to the masses before launching our combat. If the vehicle in which the military and police travel is separate from that in which the workers or other masses travel, we must also do our best to see to it that we do not cause any casualty to the workers and the other masses.

(b) Before attacking the military and police escorts of a train carrying passengers, we must consider whether we have confidence in reducing to the minimum the possible casualties to the masses before doing so. However, we

will not use explosives or other methods of overturning the train, because that will cause casualties to the masses. Even granted that we do not cause any casualty, still it will make the masses believe that we act in disregard of their lives, and the political reaction will be adverse to us. Lorries transporting ordinary goods must also not be overturned, in order to avoid the loss of goods to the masses. Trains carrying troops or military goods, leading cars travelling alone (but not leading cars of a passenger train) and railway armed patrol cars shall be overturned and sabotaged by means of various methods.

(c) Actions such as the sabotaging of railroad, highways, bridges and materials and machinery for the repairs and building of roads must be constantly proceeded with, because in this way it is possible to obstruct the communications of the enemy and, to a certain degree, can serve the purpose of dealing a blow to the enemy militarily and of impeding his hands. In this way, the lives of the masses will not be endangered. The destroyed highways and bridges will eventually be discovered by the enemy, and he will proceed to repair them so that there is no danger of the vehicles of the masses being overturned.

(d) In attacking the bases of the enemy, such as the Special Constabulary quarters and Police Stations, every attention must be paid, with a view to reducing the losses of the masses.

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If the enemy's military and police are accommodated in the same house as the masses, every effort must be made to stealthily gain entrance to it and launch a surprise attack, so that the possible casualties may be comparatively small. In regard to the use of fire power, if the possibility of endangering the houses of the masses is comparatively small, we will, necessitated by the carrying on of our combat, have recourse to it. We will not do it if there is every possibility of endangering the adjacent houses of the masses.

(e) In regard to launching a surprise attack on the enemy, we will not proceed with it in the case of any train and bus carrying passengers and in the case of goods vans and other vehicles in which the masses are intermingled with others, because the casualties that may be caused will be extremely serious.

(f) In regard to throwing hand-grenades; in cases where the masses are mixed up among others, we must consider whether we have confidence in reducing to the minimum the possible casualties among the masses. The masses must include the family, shop assistants and servants, etc., of the person who is the target of the hand-grenade throwing (ofcourse, if they are all running dogs themselves, this does not apply). Even if it is a case of throwing a hand-grenade on a target of special significance, we must similarly do our best to see that we do not accidentally bomb the masses. It is all right

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to open fire at the running dogs who intermingle with the masses, but even then we must pay every attention to avoid any stray bullets killing the masses.

(g) We will constantly proceed to sabotage telephone wires, because this can, to a certain degree, be a blow to the enemy's contact by communications.

(h) All the British Imperialist vehicles conveying troops, police and detectives may be burnt. If no armed personnel are on them and we want to halt them, we will not do so by opening fire but shall use other methods to compel them to halt.

(i) All military buildings, including military stores, may be burnt. Under conditions in which there is every possibility of endangering the houses of the masses or the stores of non-reactionary national capitalists, we may nevertheless proceed to burn if the launching of our attack on the enemy bears a very important significance; but we will not do so if the blow on the enemy will not be greatly felt by him.

In regard to other activities, we must pay attention to the following:-

(a) In undertaking activities such as the hoisting of flags, posting of slogans and the distribution of handbills, etc., we must see whether or not such actions bear any practical significance. If they do, then we may proceed with them. If to do so at a given spot and under given circumstances does not bear any practical significance, or is more

likely to affect other more important activities, then we will refrain from it. We must not go about it strictly according to formality.

(b) In regard to the requisition of food and ther materials situated in conditions in which the enemy is enforcing a strict food control, we may, if deemed necessary, requisition food from business shops or the masses by intercepting lorries conveying food. However, we must, as far as we can, pay for it. In cases where we have no money, we may write out an I.O.U. chit and find ways and means later to make payment. With regard to those masses and small business shops, we must all the more do our very best to avoid having to delay payment to them.

(c) Regarding confiscation; with regard to the enemy's properties, we will confiscate them no matter in what form they may be. As for the properties of the running dogs and the enemy spies, if they have families, and again if they belong to the peasant classes or the petty bourgeoisie, then we will not confiscate them. This is because, if we confiscate them, it will affect the livelihood of their families and, moreover, there is no means of distinguishing whether the properties or goods belong to them or to the families. At the same time, the properties and goods of these people cannot be considerable. However, in circumstances in which we deem it very necessary, we may proceed to confiscate a portion thereof, depending on the given circumstances. If they are the properties of the capitalists, we may proceed to confiscate a portion thereof, depending on the given circumstances.

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If they are the properties of the capitalists or of running dogs who have acquired them by exploiting the masses, then we must confiscate them. However, even then we will have to pay regard to the livelihood of their families. We will proceed with the confiscation in accordance with the given circumstances; we must not go all out in the confiscation. In time, in confiscating the properties of running dogs and enemy spies, we will rather be generous in proceeding with it with a view to increasing the political reaction on them and, to a certain degree, facilitating our attempt to win over their families, and so avoid their being stubbornly opposed to us to the end.

(e) In relation to stopping the production and operations of rubber estates and factories of reactionary or stubborn capitalists, in dealing with the reactionary and stubborn capitalists, we will employ the tactic of stopping the production and operation of their rubber estates and factories in order to sound warning to them and compel them to undertake to contribute money to bolster up the war. We will do this if there is no other alternative. If it is for a short period of suspension of work (for instance, within ten days) we will generally talk it over properly with the workers of rubber estates and factories. At the same time, we will bring up to them certain propositions for improvement of their livelihood so that they may not suffer too great a loss as the result of suspension of work.

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When sponsoring the suspension of work, we must endeavour to educate nicely and talk the workers round, and also discuss with them regarding certain difficulties that may appear during the period of suspension of work. If the stubborn employers should cause the suspension of work to protract indefinitely, we must consider whether or not we should change our tactics by partially sabotaging the factories or by slashing some rubber trees or by other methods in order to gain victory. In the event, however, of all our methods proving ineffective, then we must consider whether or not we are able to arrange for the workers of such rubber estates and factories to obtain jobs elsewhere, so that they may not be thrown out of employment. If this is not possible, then it will not be good to compel such rubber estates and factories to suspend operations indefinitely.

Regarding the problem of compulsion in relation to mass movement:-

As far as our Party's relations with the masses is concerned, it is to educate, to talk the masses round and to guide them in proceeding with their struggle in order to increase the degree of their cognition and consciousness. Our Party must not in the least compel the masses, because compulsion is in contravention of the mass line of action of our proletarian class. As for compelling those belonging to the bourgeoisie to undertake contributing money, this is because such financial contribution savours of the paying of taxes. If it is a case of voluntary contribution, there must naturally be no compulsion.

As far as the mass movement itself is concerned, under a given basis and given circumstances, we may enforce a certain

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degree of compulsion. That is to say that, if it is through the self-awakening and self-willingness of the entire masses, or through the resolution passed by the vast majority of the masses at a meeting, with the object of striving for or consolidating their own interests, then compulsion may be enforced. Such compulsion concerns the business of the masses themselves, and it is not the Party that enforces compulsion on the masses.

For instance, for the sake of consolidating the mass organisations, a People's Pact may be formed (or Pacts of such organisations). The main contents of a People's Pact comprise, essentially, secrecy and security and organisational procedure, etc. The carrying out of this Pact by the masses should also be greatly helpful to our security. However, the provisions as specified in the People's Pact must be of practical significance and be such as the exigency of the moment and the local conditions permit and as are acceptable to the masses. Those provisions which lose their significance or are impracticable, due to a change of environment, must be revised or cancelled. After it has been formulated and widely propagandized and the masses made to recognise it, the Pact shall then be enforced and shall naturally assume a compulsory character. It is naturally established upon the basis of the self-awakening of the masses. In the course of carrying out the People's Pact, the method of giving commendation and of meting out punishment may also be enforced; those who act in an exemplary manner in abiding by the People's Pact shall be given suitable commendations, while those who transgress it shall also be given suitable punishment. In meting out punishments, the method of killing, beating up and kidnapping, etc., must not be used (this, of course, does not apply to those spies who betray the organisation). Their goods should not be confiscated, neither should they be given warning. This is because the ordinary masses do not clearly understand the meaning of a warning and

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are liable to have the wrong idea that, if they again commit a mistake, their lives will likely be in danger. Generally speaking, the methods of meting out a punishment should be by awakening them, by remonstrating with them, by criticising them and by imposing a light fine of not more than one dollar. The reason is, the positive meaning of meting out punishment lies in trying to educate the masses and raise the cognition of the masses. If the fine is too much, the burden of the masses will be too heavy on the one hand, and it is liable to cause them to have a wrong impression that the imposition of the fine is in order to increase our financial receipts. Thus the positive meaning of meting out punishment will definitely be lost.

Among the masses, it is quite possible that there may be some retrogressive elements who may frequently commit mistakes and transgress the People's Pact. We must try patiently to win over and educate such retrogressive elements, gradually raising the degree of their consciousness. Under no circumstances should we look upon the retrogressive elements as reactionary elements. If we look on them as reactionary elements, it is frequently likely that they will really take to the reactionary path which is opposed to us.

Irrespective of whether it be a political or economic struggle against the enemy, if a pact among the masses themselves is to be formulated, it must be in accordance with the policy of the Party in directing the struggle of the masses and in consonance with the principle, which is willingly accepted by the masses themselves. Only such a pact can be helpful in giving a fillip to the struggle and can be accepted and observed by the masses.

In the course of our work among the masses, if they cannot accept our views, we shall amend such views if we can do so

forthwith and put before them new views instead. If these views involve the resolutions of the higher level organisation, and we have failed several times to persuade the masses to carry them out, then we must stop carrying them out. We must quickly submit a careful report of the position to the higher level organisation and await its decision. In so doing, it is not to say that the lower level organisation fails to carry out the resolutions of the higher level organisation, but it involves rather a question of the Party's relationship with the masses. If we should insistently compel the masses to carry them out, that will mean transgressing the Party's line of action vis a vis the masses.

1. As far as the directing organisation is concerned, it is necessary that it should give attention to making extensive investigations so as to have a clear understanding of the relations between the "Min Yuen" working personnel and the masses, about the demands, feeling, etc., of the masses, so that whatever resolutions are announced by the directing organisation may be completely in harmony with the demands and benefits of the masses. Furthermore, all decisions on concrete problems must be comparatively subtle and not stereotyped, so that no difficulty is experienced in carrying them out. In short, the attempt at understanding the conditions of the masses must be treated as one of the phases in the Party's work of investigation and one of the features of the routine education.

2. Regarding the direction of the masses in launching the political struggle against the enemy:-

(1) The problem of utilising the lawful form of struggle - by lawful struggle here is meant the various forms of open struggle of the masses, under

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the direction of the Party, in demanding or forcing the government of the bourgeoisie to make certain concessions and to grant certain improvements. Such a struggle, judging from its outward form and the nature of its demands, is not with the intention of overthrowing the government or of coming into clash with it. Such a struggle is sometimes launched where the laws and ordinances of the government permit and sometimes may be in contravention with the laws and ordinances of the government, but all the same it is one of the kinds of lawful struggle. When directing the masses to launch an indirect struggle, we will try as far as possible to adopt the "grey" attitude by utilising elements of the upper and middle strata and various open public organisations. We will strive to gain their sympathy and support. We will even utilise the M.C.A., such as submitting demands to the British Imperialists and negotiating and making investigations, etc., through the M.C.A.

(ii) In regard to the struggle against the removal of homes: not to proceed with causing trouble, obstructing and delaying the enemy in a multiplicity of ways, thereby impeding the smooth completion of his work, is not correct. But the conditions brought forward must be reasonable. That is to say that such conditions must be compatible with the interests of the masses and acceptable to them. In order to obtain for the

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We will direct the masses in launching a direct struggle against the removal of homes; for instance, by making them surround the Police Stations to lodge their petitions, etc. This we will adopt under a given set of circumstances, that is to say under favourable environments and with sufficient reasons and at a moment when the masses are worked up to an extreme frenzy of rage and dissatisfaction. In cases where the organisation is weak, where the mass organisations are not yet consolidated, or in the case of newly expanded areas, we must adopt a comparatively mild form of struggle in order to avoid the enemy's attention and attack. We must strive to create a comparatively tranquil environment in order to facilitate our work of consolidation.

(iii) In regard to the struggle against the "Home Guards"; before their formation by the enemy, we must employ a multiplicity of lawful ways to obstruct and delay the enemy, preventing him from smoothly completing his plan. In cases where they have already been formed, we will proceed to check and stultify the reactionary purpose of the Home Guards; we will even, to a certain degree, utilize them in our service, and we will attack and eliminate the most reactionary among them.

In regard to the propaganda side of it, we must point out to them:- "We do understand that members of the Home Guard have joined up through pressure brought to bear on them. As long as they will adopt a perfunctory attitude towards the

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enemy, we will not oppose them. We will only deal with those elements among them who are loyal to the enemy and are faithfully carrying out his orders and who endeavour to attack and destroy us." Only thus will we be able to make those masses who have been forced to join the Home Guard to understand our attitude and not be afraid of us or be estranged from us or even opposed to us.

(iv) In regard to the struggle against conscription of able-bodied men: as the Imperialists are daily becoming more frantic in their preparations for war, they are certain to conscript more and more able-bodied youths to become their cannon fodder. In our propaganda, we must point out to the masses:- "The British Imperialists not only conscript them for the purpose of attacking the Malayan revolutionary movement and the masses of the people, but are even endeavouring to utilise them to invade Vietnam and China." It behoves us to call on the masses to get mobilised and to refuse stubbornly to become the cannon fodder of the enemy but instead to zealously join our Army (which includes becoming combatants, various sorts of working personnel, peasants personnel, etc.), so that out of their struggle they may be able to seek existence. Further, we must, at the outset, call upon them to make all necessary preparations, such as getting prepared with their foodstuff, etc., otherwise it is possible that we could not at short notice solve the problem of supplies, if all of a sudden a large batch of persons were to join up. Once we have the preliminary preparation in the

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form of foodstuffs, we will mobilise this new manpower in opening up the virgin land to till, and the problem of food can be solved. For those of them who do not show determination to join our army, we will call upon them to decide firmly to evade conscription (such as by escaping back to China, India, etc.). If they are unable even to evade conscription, then we will call upon them to be prepared to go to prison and to refuse being conscripted.

As for those masses who have already been forcibly conscripted, we must clearly define our attitude toward them in our propaganda to them. We must point out to them that they must adopt a perfunctory attitude towards the enemy, that they must not genuinely render their service to the enemy, that they must continue to support us and that, if they absolutely cannot help it, must remain neutral. If they can do that, we will not harm them. We will only deal with those reactionary elements among them who are specially inimical to the people and to us.

3. Regarding the activities of our Protection Corps or Self-Defence Squads. Due to the fact that the British Imperialists are concentrating their efforts on controlling the masses, which has given rise to great changes, it becomes necessary, therefore, to effect changes in the tasks, the various phases of activities and the forms of organisation, etc., of the Protection Corps or Defence Squads in districts where the masses concentrate, in order to meet the requirements of the new environments. In regard to the tasks and the various

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being too glaringly known and being totally lost in the event of anything untoward occurring. We will also set about it in this way; for instance, in the struggle this time, two members of the working personnel will be responsible for it, while the rest of the working personnel, like the ordinary masses, will only show their response or secretly give their support. In the next struggle, some other members of the working personnel will be assigned to take charge of it. In this way, all these members of the working personnel will not be made to take charge of the struggles all along, and, because of their being glaringly well-known, to suffer losses. At the same time, it will provide a test to the entire working personnel in the direction of struggles and enable them to gain experience as well.

5. Regarding the problem of calling upon the masses to change their trades: we must stop calling upon the masses to change their trades, because the practical environments do not permit of this being done. The present economic situation and the policy of the British Imperialists both go to make the masses unwilling and unable to change their trades. Therefore, we now stop the propaganda of slogans regarding the changing of trades to the masses.

6. Regarding the problem of calling upon the masses to increase production: at present we must continue to call upon them to increase production. We must call upon the masses in districts over which we have control (including concentration camps over which we have control) to devise a multiplicity of

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phases of activities, apart from the necessity of basically educating and training up the members of the Protection Corps and the Defence Squads to turn them into reserve units of the Liberation Army, generally speaking, it should be our central work to help in consolidating the mass organisations. When a certain district experiences difficulty regarding food, our central work at the time should be to solve the problem of its supply; while the work of harassing and sabotaging should be considered as subsidiary, which may not be engaged in if it is possible to do so or, if engaged in, it is likely to affect the central work being carried out at the time. In regard to the form of organisations: it must be based on the basic principle of thoroughness, efficiency and secrecy. Every effort must be put in so that, in the event of any individual Corps or Squad members being arrested and turning traitors, the organisation of the district concerned will not be seriously affected.

4. In regard to safeguarding the mass working personnel:-

(i) In order to cover up the identity of the active elements among the masses, apart from the working personnel of the masses, we will organisationally treat the active elements in the same manner as the ordinary masses in our contact with them. It is not necessary to separately organise a meeting group in respect of them. However, in our contact with them individually, we must intensify our work of educating them, and the ways of our contact with them must be richly varied.

(ii) In order to ensure the safety of the masses, we must not, in conducting our struggle, let the entire body of our working personnel go out in the open to reveal their faces, but can only allocate a portion of them to go out to

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down the scale of the organisation and to ensure secrecy and safety.

(ii) They need not have their own unified directing system and directing organisation.

(iii) They must not announce their resolutions.

(iv) They must not have their own system. Even the lowest stratum need not set up a working committee. They need only form "cells" or establish individual contacts. These "cells" shall be under the direction of either the Party branch department or "cell" or individual Party member or a Party sympathiser.

This method of the Party in contacting and educating the active elements among the masses facilitates the extension of the Party's contact with the masses.

(v) The secret "cells" of the unlawful organisations formed in town should each consist of three members at most. If these persons do not clearly understand each other, then they must not be incorporated into a "cell" (even though they are already known to each other, but if they are not aware that all of them have joined the organisation, then they should also not be incorporated into a "cell") but may only be contacted individually, unless, of course, it is specially necessary to do so.

If they know that all of them have par-

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ways and methods to extend cultivation to increase production, such as, for example, by growing various cereals, vegetables, etc., in order to assist us in solving our supply difficulty and accord us support for the expansion of the war.

7. Regarding the problem of agitating the masses to boycott reactionary newspapers: at present, almost all the various open newspapers in Malaya are reactionary. Our call upon the masses to boycott the reactionary newspapers will result in there being no newspaper good enough to read at all for those masses who have to read newspapers (such as the business men, the intelligentsia, etc.) because there is at present no newspaper comparatively good enough to substitute them. Therefore, we must stop calling upon them to boycott the reactionary newspapers. However, we must still continue to expose and refute all reactionary utterances and views of the reactionary newspapers; we must blast their reactionary propaganda and isolate their reactionary influence.

8. Regarding our work in the mass organisations in important towns, we must pay attention to the following few points:-

(a) In regard to unlawful organisations in important towns, with the object of maintaining secrecy of organisation, apart from proceeding with our work with thorough efficiency and carefulness, we must also act as follows:-

(1) We must raise the quality of the constituent members, so that each and every one becomes a member of the mass working personnel. In the case of those of them who lack the necessary qualifying conditions we will gradually abandon our relations with them and finally stop their relations

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participated in the organisation, then they may be incorporated into one "cell".

(b) The mass working personnel in town (including those of them who are Party members and non-Party members) must absolutely not engage in the activities of disseminating and posting up of propaganda materials, hoisting of the Red Flags, etc., and generally must not also undertake the work of raising contributions (this does not apply to the case of any special target). Further, generally, they should not also undertake to make purchases of materials, which work, however, may be assigned to an individual among them.

• (c) The unlawful organisations may, excepting the underground Trade Unions, the Anti-British League, etc., set up "cells" of sympathisers for the Liberation Army. If deemed necessary, these "cells" may be set up and directed by the active elements among the masses.

(d) One Party member shall expand and direct the unlawful mass organisations. The "cells" shall be limited to two only. The mass working personnel shall, generally speaking, expand and direct one "cell".

(e) The town organisation must train up a working personnel, particularly young cultural working personnel, to send to the organisation and the forces in the rural areas. Therefore, it is very necessary for us to be active among middle school students. We must set about this phase of our work satisfactorily.

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(f) In the case of the Party's working personnel and the mass working personnel in town, particularly the important ones, who find the position untenable, they must be sent in time to the rural area to participate in activities with the forces of the "Min Yuen", in order to avoid facing danger at the hands of the enemy.

(g) To mobilise the cultural working personnel for the purpose of writing our manuscripts to contribute to open publications in order to extend the influence of the Party. The technique employed must naturally be subtle in order that they may be accepted for publication.

(h) The carrying out of activities in town, such as seizure of arms, traitor-extermination, sabotage, creating disturbances and open propaganda, etc., must be undertaken by those belonging to the Special Service and personnel belonging to the "Min Yuen" must not be mobilised to do it. In the case of towns adjoining the rural areas (such as Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, etc.) the personnel of the "Min Yuen" similarly must not be mobilised to undertake such activities. We can only mobilise the strength we can obtain in the rural areas to proceed with the town activities of seizing arms, traitor exterminating, sabotaging, creating disturbances and conducting open propaganda, etc.

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TASK TWO.

"To actively carry out struggles, to try to achieve the best results in the seizure of arms, to intensify the consolidation of the forces politically and to pay attention to recruiting new members for the forces."

More attention must be paid to the following problems regarding the work of consolidating the forces politically.

(i) The problem of intensifying the education in politics. The points specially suggested here are:-

(a) To intensify the education of the comrades regarding the situation. This work is very important. Many comrades have a faint idea about the situation and some of them have even committed mistakes in this respect. For this reason they have lost confidence in the prospects of the revolution. They also feel pessimistic and disappointed. Therefore, it is necessary to study together with the comrades fully and repeatedly the resolutions of the Party in regard to the analysis of the international and Malayan situations, in consonance with the concrete materials that are connected with such analysis, with a view to raising the cognition of the comrades regarding the situation and increasing their confidence in the revolution.

(b) To intensify class education. The majority of the members of our forces comprise workers and peasants who are the most oppressed classes of the people. Our military forces

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are supposed to demand the liberation of the people as much as for the workers and peasants. Therefore, if we are able to intensify class education properly and increase class hatred of the comrades, then this hatred will be directed against the British Imperialists as well as the social system of capitalism. As such, the comrades will have a high degree of class consciousness. The morale of the forces will consequently be maintained. The contents and methods of class education are many. Every place must absorb the past experiences to improve on this work. Some good forms as an Appeal Committee may also be adopted, because the majority of our comrades are the children of the poor. They have suffered hardships when they were small and had very little or no chance at all of going to school to learn. Some of them worked like bulls and slaves for half a lifetime, as a result of which they still have no wives. Some of them luckily got married but have no means of enabling their children to lead a slightly improved life, and of giving them a chance to learn.

In carrying out political activities, it is necessary to enlighten and assist comrades to recollect their past experiences in life. And from the real hardship which they have experienced in their lives we must point out to them the reasons which cause them to exper-

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how to eradicate this hardship for ever. We are thereby able to raise the cognition of the comrades and their class consciousness. Some of them think in this way: "Our comrades are not undergoing so much hardship as those peasants in China." Therefore, this work is not easy to attract people when carrying it out, and it is difficult to achieve any educational results. In fact, this is wrong because actual activities carried out in a good number of places have proved that this is one of the most effective methods to adopt in intensifying class education.

(c) To intensify cultural education. The contents regarding cultural education are many. Firstly, it is necessary to have education on learning the characters. Starting from learning the characters, we must advance gradually with the education in order to raise the cultural level of the comrades. As for some of the comrades who know a bit of the characters, we must also do the same thing and continue to raise their cultural level. It is only by continuously raising the cultural levels of the comrades that we will be able, more effectively, to carry out political education, in order to raise the political level of the comrades. Regarding the education on learning the characters, we must make use of the military and civilian text books which are edited and printed by the "Emancipation Press" and then gradually proceed on with the education. In this way we shall be sure to achieve good results. In the various places where the comrades have finished learning these lessons, we must further supply them with documents and articles to read.

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(ii) Regarding the problem of carrying out the system of rewards and punishments in the forces: the forces continue to proceed with their struggles and activities, while the comrades, in carrying out the struggles and activities, have constantly rendered meritorious service in various forms. At the same time, in the course of carrying out the struggles and activities the comrades may sometimes inevitably commit various sorts of offences. Therefore, it is necessary and most important that we must immediately encourage and suitably reward those who have rendered meritorious service, whereas for those who have committed offences we must punish them immediately and give them suitable education. It is only by doing this that we will be able to increase the determination of the comrades in rendering their services to the people, to help the comrades to be more vigilant about committing mistakes, so that they will not always commit mistakes, and to assist the forces to maintain a high morale for ever. For the past three years, the forces in various places have carried the system of rewards and punishments and, during the concrete execution of this system, have gained a lot of experience. A few points relating to this are given as follows:-

(a) we can enforce the system of merits and demerits. That is to say that every member of the forces will be issued with a book for recording his merits and demerits.

(b) Merits will be divided into two kinds, i.e. great merits and small merits. Three small merits will be counted as one great merit. At the same time, if the work done by a comrade is not enough to score a small merit, then a special mark will be recorded in his favour. Three special marks will count as one small merit.

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(c) Apart from being able to gain merits during the struggles, we can also gain merits in the course of carrying out activities. After each struggle, it is necessary immediately to make a review and summing-up of the struggle, whereby the merits of every comrade will be assessed and recorded in his favour without any delay. As regards the carrying out of activities, it is necessary, according to the working plans of each period, to sum up the manifestations and working results of every comrade in that period, whereby decision will be made as to the degree of merit to be recorded in his favour. Or suppose a certain comrade is given a certain special work to do and has successfully completed the undertaking, then consideration must be given to his contribution in carrying out this undertaking, so that his merits will be assessed and recorded.

(d) If this work of recording merits was not properly carried out in the past in certain districts and forces, then the past service of the comrades can be re-assessed (it can start from the time the Anti-British National Liberation war began), and an additional record and commendation be made. As regards the comrades who sacrificed themselves in the past, their meritorious services rendered should be individually scrutinised and assessed and an additional record of their merits be made. We also call upon all the comrades to hold a memorial service in their honour.

(e) No matter whether it be in struggles or in carrying out activities, the assessment of merits

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democratic principles. That is to say that an assessment meeting should be held immediately for that purpose. However, the meeting is merely to discuss and to arrive at a conclusion. A report on the discussion will be submitted to the directing organ for its reference, but as to how the merits will be recorded, it is up to the directing organ to give its final decision.

(f) Apart from recording individual merits, merits that are gained collectively can also be recorded, such as merits gained by a unit or a platoon or a company, and a collective commendation given. If a merit gained collectively is considered to be above the level of a great merit, it can, if necessary, be recorded as a special merit.

(g) Apart from appropriately recording the merit of an individual or a collective body who has rendered meritorious service, it is still possible to select the fighting heroes, the models or the outstanding workers from among these people based on an incident or on a period during which activities have been carried out. For an individual the grades will be: Special grade, "A" grade, "B" grade, "C" grade, etc.; a fighting hero, a model warrior or an outstanding worker in a certain task. For a collective body the grades will be: Special grade, "A" grade, "B" grade, "C" grade, etc.; a heroic unit, platoon or company; a model unit, platoon or company, or outstanding workers in a certain task.

(h) As regards an individual and a collective body having rendered meritorious service and

glorious glory, we must announce his or their glorious

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achievements and call upon the comrades and other units to learn from and align with them. At the same time, we must hold a grand meeting to celebrate this occasion, so as to raise the morale of the comrades and to exhort them to actively render their services to the people.

(1) As regards those who have committed offences, appropriate punishment must be meted out to them according to the nature and degree of seriousness of their offences committed. In recording offences, we should divide them into two types, i.e. serious offences and light offences: three light offences will be counted as one serious offence. With regard to committing a mistake which does not amount to a light offence, then a defect shall be recorded. Three defects will be counted as one light offence. The defects mentioned here are not those committed in our daily life and which are not subject to disciplinary punishment; it will be quite all right that these mistakes be criticised at a review meeting and not necessarily recorded. For those who have committed mistakes, we must be patient to educate them so as to enable them to have a correct idea about their mistakes and to overcome them quickly without any delay.

(j) In order to enable those who have committed mistakes to quickly and determinedly overcome their mistakes which have been recorded as committing a serious offence or a defect, we must give them a chance to compensate their mistakes with merits by fixing a time for them and indicating to them the methods of

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overcoming their mistakes, or by allocating to them a certain task to undertake. We must scrutinise their work from time to time. If it has been proved that they have overcome their mistakes and completed their task originally allocated to them, then the punishment meted out to them can be cancelled, i.e. to cancel the offence that has been recorded against them.

As regards the struggles, we have issued many views in the past and we can mention only a few of them here:-

1. Every individual unit (in the State and District) should not, just because the enemy is severely attacking other units, fail to firmly grasp a favourable opportunity in consolidating and expanding its achievements (by intensifying the activities of the "Min Yuen" and by carrying out struggles in which there is confidence of seizing arms) and to change its original plan by attempting to relieve the difficulties of other places.

This is to say that each unit must intensify the activities of the "Min Yuen" according to the original plan, or launch struggles in which there is confidence of winning the struggle for an objective, and not hurriedly or wilfully to launch a struggle, and to carry out disturbances and sabotage. Of course, when the direction deems it necessary, we must still consider how to conduct attacks methodically, so as to puzzle and scatter the enemy.

2. Regarding the problem of safeguarding the place where a struggle is to be continued, the following are two sets of circumstances to which attention must be given:-

- (a) In a newly developed area, where the minimum protection is still not available, the struggle should not, generally speaking, be conducted at this spot. Moreover, we should not

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even mobilise the masses of that place to conduct disturbances and sabotage. But if the masses of that place have no confidence in our strength, and in order to rouse up the feeling of the masses, we can mobilise our forces or the "Min Yuen" to carry out some small activities, such as conducting small struggles in the seizure of arms, launching surprise attacks and sabotages, etc., etc. This must be carried out to a certain degree. What we mean by the minimum protection is that the masses, after undergoing education in propaganda, have possessed a preliminary understanding of our advocacies and policies and are able to sincerely and zealously support us. Further, we have completed the work of establishing "cells" for the mass organisations and have trained up and nurtured a batch of working personnel of the masses who are able to manage the daily activities of such "cells".

(b) If a certain place at the time has experienced difficulty in the form of supplies, and if the supplies are solely dependent on another place, then we can temporarily suspend conducting struggles in that place. But we must try our very best to get supplies from other places for the purpose of conducting an early struggle in the place, so that we will not lose the opportunity of confidently scoring a victory in that struggle.

3. Regarding the problem of conducting struggles in the

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But to stress that appropriate protection in these villages is not required is also incorrect. At present, as we are still unable to safeguard directly the rural villages by means of our struggles, it is necessary for us to give certain appropriate protection. This is to say that, when a struggle unit is considering to conduct a struggle for an objective, and at the same time if there are two or more objectives of which the confidence of winning and the possibility of achieving results are more or less the same, then we should choose the objective in the non-rural village for our struggle. Otherwise we are only able to conduct our struggle in the rural village.

4. Regarding the problem of relationship between the struggles and the reorganisation and re-training of the forces: we, on the one hand, oppose conservatism that wipes away the important significance of the struggle. On the other hand, we also oppose those who solely take care to adhere to the significance of the struggle while overlooking the work of reorganising and re-training. It is obvious that we can raise the standard of the forces to a certain degree in the course of struggles, but without rest, reorganising and re-training, we have no means of carrying out the work of consolidating the forces effectively. Therefore, we must give suitable consideration and decision after coordinating the struggle with reorganisation and re-training and with other tasks that are being undertaken by the forces at the moment. This is to say that we have to decide, according to the requirements and possibilities in the practical situation at the moment, whether or not to conduct struggles or to give the forces a rest, so that they will be able to reorganise and re-train themselves, or to carry out other activities.

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THIRD TASK.

"To raise the vigilance in dealing with the activities of enemy spies, and to determinedly and seriously eliminate them."

1. The enemy is very mean and cunning, and is always devising ways and means of buying our small boys to his intelligence personnel. By small boys, we mean boys who are about fifteen years old. We are not only judging the boys according to their ages, but at the same time we must see whether or not they are intelligent. If a boy is under fourteen but is as intelligent as a boy of fifteen, then we shall consider him to be a boy of fifteen. Fundamentally, we should not eliminate such types of spies. We can find suitable persons to be their sureties to guarantee that they will leave the enemy and will not continue to be the spies of the enemy and to supply any information to the enemy. If we kill these boys whose power of thinking is still undeveloped, it will affect us politically and enable the British Imperialists to carry out their propaganda accordingly. In the case of a boy who has knowledge of our organisational secrets and who will jeopardise the interests of the revolution if not eliminated, or if he is being utilised by the enemy to fanatically glean information about us, and who will threaten our security if not eliminated, then we have no alternative but to eliminate him under such circumstances.

2. Fundamentally, we do not eliminate those woman spies who are pregnant. We can banish them from the place, or find suitable persons to guarantee their behaviour. It will affect us politically if we eliminate them and enable the British Imperialists to carry out their propaganda accordingly. In the case of a pregnant woman who has knowledge of our organisational secrets and who will jeopardise the interests of the revolution

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her under such circumstances.

3. Gambling dens. We must not punish those persons who are the sponsors and thugs in gambling by eliminating them, unless they are the running-dogs of the enemy. Under present conditions, it is not appropriate for us to declare that gambling is prohibited. On the one hand, we are unable to affect a widespread prohibition and, on the other hand, if punishment is meted out to those who gamble, an adverse feeling will be aroused because a good number of the masses are always gambling among themselves. Since punishment cannot be enforced, there is no means of prohibiting this vice. Nevertheless, the problem of teaching the masses to refrain from gambling can be treated as one of the subjects in our propaganda and educational activities carried out among the masses with a view to advising them to be self-conscious and to refrain willingly from the habit of gambling, so that they will not waste their money and energy but will improve themselves in carrying out the work of national liberation.

4. We should not eliminate those petty thieves, but we must either fine them in order to compensate for the losses of the victims, or find suitable persons to guarantee them, or to warn and educate them, so as to make them repent their mistake. All this can be dealt with according to the existing practical conditions.

5. We must eliminate those robbers who are against us and who are active in an area which is controlled by us. But it is not necessary for us to eliminate all of them. As regards the individual elements, we should try to win them over to our side and should not eliminate them if there are persons to guarantee them. If they are not against us, we should try and win them over by political talks, or force them to repent their mistakes, guaranteeing to us that they will not commit robbery again in

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the future. In cities and towns that are not within our control or have no direct connections whatever with us, we must not bother about them.

6. Generally speaking, we do not eliminate those Secret Society members, but we must eliminate those who come under one of the following categories:-

(a) those who force the masses (or shops) not to contribute subscriptions to us.

(b) those who are the running dogs and intelligence personnel of the enemy.

(c) those robbers already mentioned in Item 5, who are against us and have committed robberies.

7. As regards rape cases, if the masses intend to hand over rape cases for us to deal with, then basically we will do our best to settle these cases for them, in order to prevent the culprits from receiving the death penalty. However, we must obtain consent of the raped persons and cannot forcibly do things against their will. In the event of there being no alternative save to sentence the culprits to death, then we must do so. If a case is brought up not amounting to a rape case, then it will be considered and dealt with as having tried to dally with a woman and, no matter how, the culprit should not be sentenced to death. The punishment meted out will be according to the degree of seriousness of the case, and the consent of the victims concerned must also be obtained.

8. Regarding corruptly misusing the finance of the organisation. Generally speaking, we do not eliminate those who have corruptly misappropriated the organisation's funds, but cases that have occurred under special circumstances will be excluded. As regards making profits out of purchasing things with the organisation's funds, this should be considered as showing a

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bad manifestation and should not be dealt with as a case of corruption.

9. Extortions: generally speaking, we also do not eliminate those who make use of the organisation's name in going round to collect funds, unless they still insist on doing so after having received several warnings and facts have proved that there are no means for them to remedy their mistakes.

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TASK FOUR.

"To strive for the expansion of the workers and peasants and for the betterment of livelihood."

1. Regarding the problem of infiltrating into the "yellow" Labour Unions. If, in a certain department, an open organisation has already been formed by the masses themselves, which is under our control, and if the "yellow" Labour Union in that department fails to get the support of the masses, then we will not dispatch men to infiltrate into that department. If, in that department, the "yellow" Labour Union commands similar support of the masses, then we will dispatch men to infiltrate into it. If we are unable to form an open organisation of the masses, we should infiltrate into the "yellow" Labour Unions to try to take control and win over the masses. In order to raise the confidence of the working personnel who infiltrate into these "yellow" Labour Unions, we can expand the organisation of the "yellow" Labour Unions.

2. We must not assassinate the leader and the office bearers of the "yellow" Labour Unions, because to a good number of the masses their identity has not yet been fully disclosed. We

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must attack them and disclose their running-dog identity politically, depending on the different degrees to which the masses are prepared to accept or welcome it.

3. When it is necessary, the working personnel who are carrying out open activities as well as open mass organisations can deal with the enemy with a certain scope.

4. Regarding the problems of the workers' organisations in the departments of the British Imperialists that are situated in the rural areas, such as the big estates; when we are able to control and directly contact the areas where there are workers, the main thing we must do is to organise those secret and unlawful workers. If the workers' organisations of that department are still not generally known, we can, depending on favourable circumstances, form an open organisation for the purpose of uniting the workers. If the secret organisations have become generally known, we can also form open organisations in order to facilitate our working requirements, otherwise this must not be done. Secret organisations should constitute the nucleus from which to assume control over the open organisations. If there are "yellow" Labour Unions in that department, we must, generally speaking, infiltrate into them through the secret organisations, in order to gain control over the organisations of the "yellow" Labour Unions.

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FIFTH TASK.

"To unite the national capitalists of the middle class with a view to winning more of them to align themselves on our side and isolating the enemy."

Fundamentally, we can win over the national capitalists of the middle class to participate in the revolution and to

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support us. However, the following are the types of their present manifestations:-

1. Reactionary elements - those who traditionally assist the enemy to consolidate his rule (such as those who actively participate in the social, cultural and educational activities that are under the direction of the British Imperialists) are considered as reactionary elements, including those who have no alternative but to contribute subscriptions to us, just because their properties are under our control.

2. Neutral elements - those who have not given any assistance to either party are considered as neutral. However, some of them are comparatively stubborn. As they are politically backward, they entertain certain opinions about us, refuse to assist us and even when they are under the oppression of the enemy, are still able to have the means of dealing with him.

3. Those who are in support of us - generally speaking, they must satisfy these three conditions:-

- (a) offer no help to the enemy, or respond to him perfunctorily.
- (b) pay subscriptions.
- (c) improve upon the workers' livelihood.

There are some elements who, on the one hand, respond to the enemy, while on the other offer us help. If they are sincere in helping us, they will be considered as our supporters. There are also other elements, whose properties are under our control, who only pay us money for a while and then stop, to

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meet our needs after we have strong actions against them (such as burning their smoke houses, slashing their rubber trees and other forms of warning). These elements can only be regarded as respondents and not as supporters. If, however, they should later pay subscriptions regularly, then they will be considered as gradually becoming our supporters.

As regards the neutral elements (including those somewhat diehard ones) we will have to patiently find a way to win them over. Generally, we should, as far as possible, avoid slashing their rubber trees and burning their property, but should threaten them by causing damage to the property of reactionary elements, etc., residing in their vicinity in order to force them to pay money. If, however, they still stubbornly refuse to pay money to us after being warned, appropriate action may be taken against them, e.g., by setting fire to a portion of their property or by slashing some of their rubber trees. Nevertheless, they or their families must on no account be assassinated or detained for ransom. In other words, room must be reserved for future negotiations with them when action against them is taken.

In regard to the progressive elements, i.e. those who are in support of us, it behooves us all to further strengthen our unity with them, to educate them to a greater extent, to enhance their cognition of the anti-British national liberation war and of the Party's policy, so that they will support and participate in the revolution with greater interest. Should they possess any mistaken manifestation (e.g. improper cognition of the British Imperialists, or insincerity in the improvement of the workers' livelihood, etc.) they should be given some friendly and earnest advice to enable them to rectify their faults.

Consideration is unnecessary in taking action against reactionary elements, but wherever possible the degree of punish-

ment should vary according to the extent of their reactionary character and their detriment to the revolution. For example, the most, or comparatively, reactionary ones may be exterminated to serve as a warning to those who are not so reactionary so that the latter will no longer remain reactionary and side with the enemy (e.g. by being insincere and by helping the enemy) but will instead support us financially and otherwise.

As regards the slogan, "benefits for employers and employees alike", by this we mean that, under the system of new democracy, the working class acts as the master but at the same time allows the private capitalists to prosper. That is why implementation of the policy that both parties should share benefits alike is necessary in attaining the aim of industrial and economic prosperity. In Colonies where the Imperialists rule, it is impossible for employers and employees to share benefits alike; nor is it possible to achieve economic prosperity. Consequently, in the course of the present struggle for a better livelihood, we shall have mention of the slogan, "Benefits for employers and employees alike".

The problem of taking appropriate care of the interests of the national capitalists in the lower and middle classes. For the purpose of implementing the Party's policy of achieving an "anti-British national united front", it is necessary to take appropriate care of the interests of the national capitalists in the lower and middle classes. Generally, when making financial demands in the course of struggling for a better livelihood, care should be taken to see that the employers have some profits to make, or else they will obviously stop tapping or operating their factories as they will never be willing to run any business without any profit or at a loss. If the tin and rubber prices continue to drop and the employers take that opportunity to cut down wages to an unreasonable extent, then a campaign to oppose the wage cut should be launched. But if the cut is normal, the labouring masses

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will naturally have to accept it.

When Malaya is in an unfavourable economic position and when the rubber and tin prices are at a particularly low level, employers should not be allowed to continue making profits, or else the labouring masses will be deprived of even their basic requirements in life. In such a case, the workers must be led determinedly to oppose the wage-cut so that they will be able to lead a minimum basic life. With no profits to make, the employers will certainly stop tapping or operating their factories. The workers, under such circumstances, should suggest taking over the management of the rubber estates or factories for the time being and pay all the costs of running them. In this way, the employers, although having no profits to make, yet need not suffer a loss. An agreement fixing the return of the management to the employers at a certain time may be entered into. If, however, the employers refuse decisively to allow the workers to take over temporarily, especially when the latter are willing to suffer a bit and allow the employers a slight profit, then punishment may be meted out to the employers in accordance with the workers' opinion, in order to prevent unemployment caused by the stoppage of tapping or suspension of work in factories.

Action against the wealthy national capitalists may be taken without any consideration. These people should be isolated and punished by all ways and means. Those whose crimes are notorious may be exterminated and their properties confiscated when victory is achieved. As for those whose manifestation is not so bad, or those who are comparatively inactive, and if we can force them (i.e. those whose properties are under our control) to pay subscriptions or to accept other

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conditions such as granting better treatment to the workers, etc., we may negotiate with them individually in order to weaken the influence of the reactionary camp.

As regards the problem of financial responsibility to be undertaken by the petty bourgeoisie:-

(i) Generally speaking, in accordance with Malaya's economic position, estate owners with less than one hundred acres may be classified under the category of the petty bourgeoisie. The merchants in small towns and the majority of business men in medium sized towns whose capital is equivalent to the value of the aforementioned acreage of rubber estate may also be classified under this category, which, in addition, includes others whose properties resemble that of the aforementioned elements.

(ii) In regard to wage-earners and hawkers with poor incomes, funds may in general be collected from them as from other workers and peasants. Allow them to contribute what they can and refrain from using any force on them.

(iii) As for those petty bourgeoisie who are comparatively well-off, e.g. estate owners, shop keepers and factory proprietors, they must be held responsible for a fixed sum of contribution. The stubborn and stingy ones, who either refuse to pay or pay insufficiently, have to be educated and convinced in all manner of ways. If, however, they still fail to pay after being persuaded several times, appropriate action may then be taken against them to serve as a warning. As for those who are willing to pay but who pay insufficiently, they may be educated and convinced for a long period

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until they finally pay their full share. Action, however, should not be taken against them.

(iv) As regards those comparatively well-off petty bourgeoisie who cannot pay their full shares of contribution for the reason that they have large families to support or for other good reasons, we should be sympathetic with them and reduce appropriately their shares of contribution towards the war expenses.

(v) As regards the families of revolutionary elements, of martyrs and distressed persons (such as those who have their members arrested or banished by the British Imperialists) we have to take special care of them, even though they possess certain properties. If they are in difficulty, we should cut, or even waive, their share of contribution.

As regards the financial responsibility to be undertaken by the nationalist capitalists and petty bourgeoisie, the standard rates are as follows:-

Rubber Estates.

| <u>Acroage.</u> | <u>Price per ton....</u> | <u>\$31-\$60. \$61-\$90. \$90-\$120.</u> | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------|--|-----------|-----------|
| 5-20 | Contribution per ton | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 21-100 | | 1.50 | 3 | 4.50 |
| 101-200 | | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| 201-500 | | 2.50 | 5 | 7.50 |
| 500 and above | | 3 or more | 6 or more | 9 or more |

Remarks.

1. Owners of about one hundred acres or less belong to the petty bourgeoisie; take care of them as much as possible.
2. If the owners pay their full share of contribution accordingly, then they need not be compelled to pay fixed amounts on commemorative occasions. Naturally, it will be better to ask them to pay bigger contributions if possible.

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3. Those who have not paid any special contributions before, or who have only paid very small amounts of rubber contribution, then their first special contribution will be based on their property and collected by force if necessary.

4. If the price of rubber exceeds \$120 per picul, the rates of contribution may be raised accordingly.

Mines, Factories and Business Houses.

Profits per month:-

Rate of contribution:-

| | |
|-----------------|------|
| Below \$150 | 2.5 |
| \$150-\$500 | 5.0 |
| \$500-\$1,000 | 7.5 |
| \$1,000-\$2,000 | 10.0 |
| \$2,000-\$5,000 | 12.5 |
| \$5,000-\$8,000 | 15.0 |

Remarks.

1. Profit refers to net profit, i.e. after deductions of staff salaries and wages, business expenses and also salaries of owners and their families if they are actually engaged in running the businesses.

2. According to present conditions, those earning a profit of less than \$1,000 a month are generally petty bourgeoisie and should be taken care of as much as possible.

3. If they pay their full shares every month, they need to be forced to pay fixed amounts as special contributions on commemorative occasions. Naturally, it will be better if they can be asked to pay more.

4. Those who have not paid any special contributions before, or who have only paid very small amounts of profit contribution, then their first special contribution will be based on their property and collected by force, if necessary.

The standard rates set out above are meant only for reference by the various places and may be increased or reduced according to the practical conditions and needs of each place.

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TASK SIX.

"Performance of activities against the enemy and his accomplices."

With regard to determinedly executing our policy relating to captives, the following points must be wholly observed:-

1. Other than deserters, renegades and those whom the masses bitterly hate, as well as the British military, police and administration heads in all States, no one who surrenders his arms on the battlefield (including British Officers) shall be killed. Release or detention of the person shall be decided according to the circumstances. The State or District Committee shall first investigate and study about those whom the masses bitterly hate and then list them out and inform the respective units and "Min Yuen" organisations. If these are also on the lists of the units and the "Min Yuen" organisations, then they will be exterminated. However, if they have previously rendered help in winning a battle and in seizure of arms, they will not be killed, even though they are bitterly hated by the masses. But renegades are an exception. Renegades include those who betray the Party, the forces and the mass organisations.

2. Extermination of renegades and deserters is for the purpose of maintaining discipline of the revolutionary forces and the mass organisations.

3. Those who surrender after firing all their ammunition, who attempt to escape but are caught and who surrender after being wounded shall all be considered captives.

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4. The private belongings of captives, including the uniforms they wear, shall not be taken away from them, except in very needy cases and after giving satisfactory explanation. Other things belonging to the British Imperialists shall be confiscated.

5. Corpses shall not be burnt nor the clothing on them taken away (except when clothing is badly needed). Corpses shall not be cut to pieces, nor the gold teeth removed. When burning vehicles, corpses shall first be removed; if that is not possible, the vehicles shall not be burnt.

For the purpose of extending the Party's political influence and of causing the enemy and his accomplices to waver, the following points must be observed:-

1. Asian civilians, non-officials of Special Service organisations and Government servants of all nationalities (including British) shall not be assassinated unless they are actively engaged in attacking the people. They may, however, be shot if they offer resistance while being disarmed. Detectives and resettlement officers may be assassinated, as they are Special Service personnel.

2. British Officers and managers of production centres may be assassinated, but Officers of the health, medical and engineering departments shall not be assassinated unless they are Special Service men.

3. Civilian employees of the British Imperialists' War Department and women (other than woman Police Constables) shall not be assassinated, unless they are also Special Service personnel.

4. Members of the K.M.F. and M.C.A. may be assassinated if they are reactionary elements. Leaders of other political parties, however, shall not be assassinated, not

because they are not reactionary, but because the masses still do not know about them well. For instance, men like members of U.M.W.O. and Dato Sam shall not be assassinated as there are still a lot of Malays who regard them as working for their interests. If these elements openly act as running dogs secretly, they shall not be assassinated because the masses do not know of the fact that they are running dogs.

5. Malay penghulus, generally, shall not be assassinated, unless they are very bad and are commonly hated by the villagers.

6. Elimination of the traitors - care must be taken and the opinion of the masses considered. If it is found that immediate eliminations will cause misunderstanding or dissatisfaction to the masses, then it will be postponed. But if the traitor has already come to know of the organisation's secrets, and if postponement of his elimination is detrimental to the interests of the revolution, then he may be exterminated at once.

7. For the purpose of seizing arms, any enemy who possesses them may be assassinated.

8. Sniping (including shooting and grenade throwing); all enemy policemen, soldiers, Special Service and other armed personnel may be attacked, with Gurkha and British soldiers as the first targets. Defence workers, auxiliary policemen, etc., shall not be attacked unless for the purpose of seizing arms or in self defence, or for exterminating the most reactionary ones amongst them, or if all of them are reactionary, or if they are accompanied by police and soldiers, or when they go on patrol in rubber estates and in the jungle. Policemen in stations shall not be attacked if their

chiefs possess good manifestations and can control the

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subordinates (if any of the subordinates is bad, he may be dealt with individually) otherwise all of them may be attacked.

9. Seizure of arms from defence workers and auxiliary policemen may be carried out where necessary. If the arms are bought by themselves, they shall be compensated for with money accordingly. Families shall be compensated for the killing of their members in battle. Those who have had their arms seized by us previously shall also be paid compensation after investigations have been made. When there are no funds to meet the payments, promissary notes may be issued as a temporary measure, to be exchanged with some money later on. Payments can be made partly with money and partly with promissary note.

Regarding the contacting and organising of the elements of the enemy bogus organisations, attention must be given to the following points:-

1. Regarding the personnel of the enemy's military and police (including Special Constabulary) and of other Government departments, contacting them and organisers individually can be proceeded with. If they request to participate in mass organisations, they may become individual constituent members. It is not necessary to set up an organisational structure or for them to lead a "cell" life. This can be conveyed to the masses by word of mouth or by written contact. The important features of contact are as follows:-

Propagandize and introduce to them the Party's resolutions and policies so that they may have a cognition of them. Pass on to them various information so that they may understand the enemy's conditions. Heighten their capability and make them adept at concealing their

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own identity so as to embark, in their original capacity, upon appropriate activities and to expand subtly our political influence. But they must not be allowed to expand the organisation and raise contributions. Generally speaking, they are to disseminate our propaganda materials. For those individuals who are reliable and who show capability in open activities, open and lawful mass organisations may be set up so as to raise their status and prestige among the masses and, at the same time, conceal their identity so as to facilitate the conduct of their activities. Under certain circumstances in which it is unsuitable or difficult to contact formally under the name of the organisation, we should try through the masses to exercise a control over them, or to make them remain neutral and utilise personal friendships to contact them and secretly convey to them our resolutions and policies. Only contact them formally under the name of the organisation after the struggle for suitable conditions has succeeded.

2. "HomeGuard", elements of the higher strata, auxiliary police and officials of the M.C.A. may be individually contacted. When the need arises, the work of organising other elements can be given to those who are already under contact and are organised. However, on the other hand, we must see to the reliable attitude of those whom we contact, and we must fix suitable methods of carrying out our activities and of further absorbing

would-be followers in order not to disclose their identity and thereby cause subsequent losses. This is

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particularly so in the case of newly expanded places like Malay villages where special care must be taken to investigate and study conditions before suitably preparing for this sort of work. Regarding the lower stratum, constituent members of these organisations (including auxiliary police), we will attend to them according to the practical circumstances. Generally speaking, apart from special circumstances, they may be organised according to the method used in organising the ordinary masses.

3. Generally speaking, the military, police and other bogus organisations of the enemy have already shown signs of wavering, but this is not very serious and widespread. Therefore, in the conduct of this sort of work our vigilance must be raised on every occasion to avoid being trapped or betrayed. The extent of the duties and trust is to be decided according to the circumstances and degree of reliability of the individuals. They must not be believed perfunctorily directly contact is made and without suitable scrutiny. Moreover, safeguards should be made to avoid any "turning over" and betrayal during the course of contacting and organising them.

4. The strictest methods of security for the execution of this sort of work must be maintained so as to prevent those comrades who are not connected and not concerned with it to understand about the conditions of any work of this branch. Direct contact with the higher levels can be made by individual comrades who have been assigned to do so in any phase of the work when occasion necessitates it. Reports to and discussions with such organisations of the same

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5. With regard to propaganda literature connected with this sort of work, it is most important that all districts should pay attention to issuing more publications and endeavour to make the contacts more substantial on the one hand, and the technique of the work of dissemination should be raised and every subtle method devised and adopted so as to ensure practical results from the propaganda materials on the other hand.

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PART SEVEN.

"To strive for a steady supply of foodstuffs and materials."

Two separate documents on the execution of this sort of duty have been supplied (i.e. regarding directive on the opening of jungle land for cultivation and the decision on the work of providing nourishment, maintenance of health and the method of dealing with personal finance and materials). No further views will be given here.

addendum of the Secretariat of the Johore State Committee. This directive from "Central" is only sent to comrades of the State Committee. The Secretariat will issue a separate directive when this is to be transmitted to comrades of the lower levels, and when it is to be executed by comrades of the lower levels. Therefore, it is not necessary for "Central" to transmit this directive to comrades of the lower level in order to avoid duplication.

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